Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citizens'personal experiences with civil servants appear to be signi…cantly better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers di¤er in laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal incentive contracts for public sector workers under di¤erent informational assumptions. When civil servants' e¤ort is unveri…able, lazy workers …nd working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out workers with a public service motivation. When e¤ort is veri…able, the government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the economy's laziest workers by o¤ering separating contracts, which are both distorted. Even though contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better o¤ as public goods come at a lower cost.
Introduction
Bureaucrats have a bad reputation. Jokes about bureaucrats'laziness and stories on bureaucratic errors abound. The lack of monetary incentives at public organisations is supposed to attract workers who are most averse to exerting e¤ort. This pessimistic view is also prominent in the economics literature. For several decades, the literature has identi…ed bureaucrats as pursuing their narrow self-interest, usually being at odds with the interest of society (see Tullock, 1965 , Downs, 1967 , Niskanen, 1971 , and Buchanan, 1978 ).
However, when citizens are asked for their personal experience with public agencies, many tend to be satis…ed with the performance of the agency.
Customers'evaluation of a speci…c agency or civil servant is signi…cantly better than their evaluation of the government or bureaucrats in general (Katz et al., 1975 , Goodsell, 1985 . Hence, as Wilson (1989) phrases it: "...those lazy, incompetent bureaucrats must work for some other agency..." (p. x).
This suggests that at least some civil servants do not …t the stereotype.
It is also in line with a number of recent papers stressing the importance of 'public service motivation' for incentive schemes and workers' e¤ort in the public sector (Francois, 2000 , Dixit, 2002 , Delfgaauw and Dur, 2002b , Prendergast, 2003 , Glazer, 2004 , Besley and Ghatak, 2004 .
How to reconcile these seemingly opposing points of view? This paper develops a model with three types of workers: regular, motivated, and lazy workers. Compared to regular workers, lazy workers have higher cost of e¤ort in both the private and the public sector. Motivated workers, to some extent, enjoy exerting e¤ort in a public sector job, but are otherwise identical to regular workers. This public service motivation gives monopsony power to the government. We show that it is in the interest of a cost-minimising government to attract, besides motivated workers, lazy workers rather than regular workers.
Whereas we model the private sector as a competitive market in which workers are paid their full marginal product, the public sector is assumed to be a single organisation whose objective is to produce a certain amount of public goods at minimum cost. This organisation, which we refer to as the public …rm, attracts workers by o¤ering one or more contracts specifying the wage and, if veri…able, required e¤ort. The public …rm can not observe the workers'type and, hence, can not make the contracts contingent on worker type. Workers choose the contract that yields them the highest utility, provided that the private sector is not a better option.
We consider two cases: veri…able and unveri…able e¤ort. When e¤ort is unveri…able, the public …rm prefers to attract either motivated or lazy workers. We show that it may occur that the public …rm prefers to attract only motivated workers, but that it can not avoid hiring lazy workers as well. However, if desired public production is su¢ ciently large, the public …rm wants to attract both motivated and lazy workers, implying that the problem of nonexcludability of lazy workers is less severe.
When e¤ort is veri…able and desired production in the public sector is su¢ ciently small, the public …rm attracts only motivated workers, and extracts all motivational rents from these workers. This full rent extraction may not be possible if a second worker type is needed. Any rents motivated workers obtain when they would choose the other type's contract can not be extracted by the public …rm. Since a contract satisfying a lazy worker's participation constraint has lower wage and lower required e¤ort than a regular worker's contract, a lazy worker's contract is less appealing to the motivated workers. Therefore, the public …rm can extract more motivational rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers rather than regular workers.
The public …rm distorts both contracts in order to extract even more motivational rents. It o¤ers lower-powered incentives to lazy workers than do private …rms. This way, the lazy worker's contract becomes even less appealing to the motivated workers. However, to keep production at the desired level, this implies that the public …rm has to hire additional lazy workers, which is costly. These costs can be reduced by giving motivated workers higher-powered incentives, above the level private …rms would o¤er.
These contract distortions are cost-e¢ cient, but reduce social welfare. If we impose that the public …rm maximises social welfare rather than min-imises cost, it does not distort the contracts of the workers. Still, the public …rm prefers to attract motivated workers, but if a second worker type is needed, it is indi¤erent between lazy and regular workers. Compared to a cost-minimising public …rm, social welfare is higher. However, total cost of public goods production and, hence, taxes are also higher when the public …rm maximises social welfare. Only motivated workers bene…t, whereas the utility of lazy and regular workers decreases as a result of higher taxes.
When motivated workers are a minority in society, politicians are likely to strive for cost-minimisation rather than for social welfare maximisation, so as to please the public at large.
While there has been quite some empirical research showing that a signi…cant part of the civil work force has a public service motivation, 1 there exists little evidence con…rming the stereotype view that civil servants are more averse to exerting e¤ort than workers in the private sector. Our model implies that for lazy workers, the attractive feature of working in the public sector is that the workload is relatively low, either because e¤ort is unveri…-able, or because weak incentives are provided. In 2002, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook a survey of workers who had recently entered or left the public sector. In Table 1 , we list the percentage of workers moving between the private and the public sector who mentioned workload as one of the three most important reasons to leave their job. Workers who moved from the private sector to the public sector mention workload more often than workers who moved in the opposite direction. The di¤erence is most pronounced for central government and local governments. Education is the main exception. This may be due to the shortage of teachers in The Netherlands, or it may indicate that our model does not apply to all jobs in the public sector. If we restrict our sample to people who worked full-time at both jobs, the results provide even stronger support for our predictions, at the expense of a smaller number of observations. The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses how the paper relates to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. analyses the case where e¤ort in the public sector is unveri…able. In Section 5, e¤ort is veri…able in both sectors of the economy. Section 6 compares our results with the case where the public …rm maximises social welfare rather than minimises costs. Section 7 concludes.
Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on screening of workers'ability following the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (for an overview, see Riley, 2001 ). In a standard adverse selection model (see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002) , a …rm induces the 'low' type to exert a suboptimally low level of e¤ort, so as to extract more of the rents from the 'high' type. The contract of the 'high' type is e¢ cient. In contrast, in our model the contracts of both types are distorted. Whereas in the standard model a …rm designs contracts for a …xed number of workers, our model describes the behaviour of a …rm which has to meet a production requirement. 2 2 It is easy to extend our model to allow for price-elastic demand for the public good. Then, as in the case of a production requirement, both contracts are distorted. …tness or ability, as in the standard adverse selection model, but may also stem from heterogeneity in general work ethic or morale. Di¤erences in work ethic have been associated with, for instance, personality traits (Furnham, 1992 ) and cultural factors (Hofstede, 1991) . Caplan (2003) ('warm-glow'). The main di¤erence between our paper and earlier work is that we relax the assumption that types of agents are fully observed by the principal. 3 Most related to our work is a recent paper by Prendergast (2003) . He assumes that workers di¤er in altruism for clients. The government prefers to attract di¤erent worker types for di¤erent agencies. For agencies where the preferences of the government and clients are aligned, as in health care, the government prefers the most altruistic bureaucrats. However, when the preferences of the government and clients are not aligned, as with (suspected) criminals, bureaucrats should be biased against their clients. Prendergast 3 This paper builds on previous work. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002a) , we examine the implications of workers' intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes and show that posting a higher wage increases the probability of …lling the vacancy, but decreases the expected quality of the hiree as less motivated workers are induced to apply. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002b), we analyse the consequences of deregulation of a sector previously dominated by a public …rm in a model where workers di¤er in their intrinsic motivation to work in the sector.
shows that, when agents'types are unobservable, agencies are likely to attract both the most preferred and the least preferred workers. The latter enter the agency because they bene…t most from diverting from the government's most preferred policy.
Our work also relates to Lazear (1986) . He argues that …rms can use their wage policy so as to attract certain types of workers, just like the public …rm in our model does. Strong monetary incentives induce highly productive workers to apply at a …rm, whereas less productive workers prefer a high base salary and weak incentives (see also Lazear, 1995, and Prendergast, 1999, for surveys). Moen and Rosen (2004) have recently built on this and argue that, when there is a multi-tasking problem, competition between …rms for highly productive workers may result in too high-powered incentives from a social welfare perspective. Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) show empirically that private companies make far more use of incentive wages than public organisations. Moreover, they argue that there are insu¢ cient grounds to justify the low incentivisation of the public sector. Our model implies that lazy workers get indeed weaker monetary incentives at the public …rm compared to the private sector, and suggests that this may be cost-e¢ cient. On the other hand, motivated workers get stronger incentives.
A few papers consider heterogeneity in ability among government workers in the context of downsizing the government (Jeon and La¤ont, 1999, and Rama, 1999) . Jeon and La¤ont (1999) show that the optimal voluntary downsizing mechanism consists of a menu of public wages, severance pay, and probabilities of dismissal. The government's choice which workers to retain closely resembles our results in Section 6, where we impose that the government maximises social welfare. When workers di¤er in a sector-speci…c trait, the government prefers the workers that have a comparative advantage in the public sector, whereas when workers di¤er in a general trait, the government is indi¤erent. Our paper di¤ers in three important aspects. First, we consider a model in which workers are heterogeneous both in general and in sector-speci…c productivity, whereas Jeon and La¤ont study heterogeneity in general and in sector-speci…c productivity separately. We show that heterogeneity in sector-speci…c motivation implies that a cost-minimising government is not indi¤erent between workers who di¤er in general work ethic. Second, in their model, e¤ort is …xed, implying that they do not consider optimal incentive schemes. Third, most of our analysis focuses on a cost-minimising government rather than a social welfare maximising government.
The Model
There are two sectors in the economy, a private and a public sector. The private sector is a fully competitive market where workers receive their full marginal product. The public sector is run by a single entity, which can be thought of as the government. This single organisation will be referred to as the public …rm. Both sectors have the same linear production function:
where q is production and e is e¤ort. Each unit of production of the private sector can be sold on the world market for the exogenous price p. The public …rm produces public goods, which are therefore not priced. The desired amount of public production is given by Q. 4 First, we assume that the public …rm minimises cost of production. Next, we compare the results with a social welfare-maximising public …rm. We abstract from principalagent problems between voters, politicians, and managers of the public …rm, which implies that the objective of the public …rm is in line with the interest of (a majority of) the voters.
Three types of workers exist in the economy: regular workers r, motivated workers m, and lazy workers l. The number of workers of each type in the economy is given by N i , i 2 fr; m; lg. Lazy workers incur a greater disutility from working than the other worker types. Motivated workers derive intrinsic utility from exerting e¤ort in the public sector, but are otherwise identical to regular workers. 5 Workers know their own type, but neither private …rms nor the public …rm can observe worker types.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the private sector is given by:
where w is the wage, C(e) describes the cost of e¤ort, with properties C(0) = 0, C 0 ( ) > 0, and C 00 ( ) > 0, and i measures the degree of laziness. We assume that 0 < r = m < l .
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the public sector is given by: 6
where V (e) is a concave function with properties V (0) = 0, V 0 ( ) > 0 and V 00 ( ) < 0, and i measures the public service motivation of a worker. We assume that m > r = l = 0. Hence, only motivated workers derive utility from exerting e¤ort in the public sector. Motivated workers have an action-oriented motivation, as in Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Dur (2002a, 2002b) . Since q = e, results are the same if we assume that motivated workers intrinsically value their contribution to output ('warmglow'), as in Besley and Ghatak (2004) and Glazer (2004) . 7 As motivated workers derive motivational utility only at the public …rm, the …rm has monopsony power over these workers. 8 Competition in the private sector ensures that workers in the private sector receive their full marginal product. Hence, total wage of a worker of type i employed in the private sector is given by pe i . It follows from (1) and (2) that the optimal level of e¤ort e i of a worker of type i in the private sector is implicitly given by:
The resulting level of utility is: 6 We assume that workers are employed either in the private or in the public sector. Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector increases the distortions in the optimal contracts when worker types are unobservable. We also abstract from subcontracting, thereby ruling out that a motivated worker takes over the contracts of two or more lazy workers at the public …rm. 7 In contrast, Francois (2000) and Prendergast (2003) assume that workers have an altruistic motivation, that is, workers care about the provision of public services, but do not derive utility from their personal involvement in production. 8 Allowing for a fourth type of worker, who derives motivational utility from working in the public sector, but is lazy as well ( = m , = l ) does not a¤ect the results, unless there are much more lazy motivated workers than regular motivated workers and m is very low compared to l r .
Note that U i is decreasing in i .
For future reference, we derive the level of e¤ort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they would have intrinsic motivation to work in the private sector. This level of e¤ort, denoted by e x m , is implicitly given by:
In the public sector, we distinguish two cases, veri…able e¤ort and unveri…able e¤ort. If e¤ort is veri…able, the public …rm o¤ers one or more contracts in which both the level of e¤ort and the wage are speci…ed. In the second case, e¤ort (and output) is unveri…able above a certain level of e, e. 9 We assume that e is su¢ ciently small such that it is a binding restriction for lazy and regular workers. This requires that e < e l . Then, the public …rm can only o¤er a contract in which a wage level is speci…ed, along with the threat not to pay the wage if e¤ort is below e.
Wages in the public sector are …nanced through a lump-sum (non-distortionary) tax, uniformly levied on all workers in the economy. This implies that we can ignore taxation when deriving the optimal occupational and e¤ort choice of the workers.
Unveri…able E¤ort in the Public Sector
We …rst consider the case where in the public sector e¤ort levels above e are unveri…able. Hence, the best the public …rm can do is to o¤er a contract consisting of a wage which is only paid if the worker exerts at least e¤ort level e. Clearly, lazy and regular workers never exert more e¤ort than e.
Motivated workers may decide to exert more e¤ort, which occurs when the level of e¤ort e m implicitly de…ned by …rst-order condition
m 9 e re ‡ects that workers who do not show up at work or remain idle behind their desk all day can be detected and are …red. When e = 0, no extrinsic incentives can be provided, implying that public goods production has to rely completely on intrinsic motivation.
is greater than e. The minimum wage w i at which the public …rm can attract a worker of type i is given by the participation constraint:
where e i = e for lazy and regular workers. Using (5), we …nd that for non-motivated workers:
where the …rst term drops out using …rst-order condition (4). The inequality follows from the restriction e < e i . Hence, the public …rm prefers lazy workers to regular workers. Lazy workers value the relatively low level of e¤ort in the public sector more than regular workers and, hence, demand a lower wage. The same holds for motivated workers, but for a di¤erent reason: They require a lower wage than regular workers, as they derive motivational utility from working in the public sector. Moreover, motivated workers may exert more e¤ort than regular workers, e m e.
Whether the public …rm prefers motivated workers to lazy workers is ambiguous. Motivated workers may exert more e¤ort and need less monetary compensation for their e¤ort, but have higher opportunity cost of working in the public sector than lazy workers. However, it is possible that the …rm prefers to attract only motivated workers, but that at the wage it has to o¤er to attract them, lazy workers apply as well. In other words, lazy workers may crowd out motivated workers in the public sector. This occurs when w l = e > w m =e m and w l < w m , where w i is de…ned by participation constraint (7). 10 Then, setting w m rather than w l is optimal if:
where we assume that, when setting w m , the public …rm randomly attracts workers from the groups of motivated and lazy workers, and that utility from public goods is linear. Hence, for a larger range of parameter values, it is optimal to attract lazy workers only. With concave utility from public goods, the condition becomes even more stringent as total public output becomes uncertain when the …rm sets w m .
Crowding out of motivated workers may also happen when Q is su¢ -ciently large, such that the public …rm would like to attract all of the motivated workers in the economy and a limited number of lazy workers. Then, as the public …rm can not distinguish between lazy and motivated workers, some of the motivated workers may not obtain a public sector job. 11 
Veri…able E¤ort
When e¤ort is veri…able, the public …rm optimally o¤ers one or more contracts specifying a wage and a required level of e¤ort. Consider …rst the case where Q is su¢ ciently small, such that the …rm needs only one worker type. Given the type of worker, the optimal contract then minimises
with respect to e i , subject to the participation constraint (7) and the production constraint Q = e i n i . This gives …rst-order condition:
In the optimum, the marginal cost of e¤ort by the employed workers (the …rst term) is equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort by hiring an additional worker (the second term). Using (4) and (5), it is easy to verify that condition (9) is satis…ed for lazy workers and for regular workers if e i = e i . Hence, if the public …rm chooses to hire lazy or regular workers, it induces them to exert as much e¤ort as they do in the private sector. By (7), this implies that the public …rm has to pay them the same wage as they earn in the private sector, pe i . When we substitute e m = e m into equation (9) for i = m, we …nd, by using (4) and (5), that condition (9) is not satis…ed, since:
In Appendix A1 we prove that for each case considered in the main text, there exists a level of Q for which it is optimal for the public …rm to attract two worker types instead of one. When e¤ort is unveri…able, the supply function of public goods displays a discontinuous jump at this level of Q. When e¤ort is veri…able, the supply function is continuous but displays a kink at this level of Q.
where the inequality follows from the concavity of V (e). Hence, motivated workers are induced to exert less e¤ort than in the private sector, even though their intrinsic motivation makes them willing to exert more e¤ort at the same wage than in the private sector. The intuition is straightforward.
As the marginal rents from motivation of a single worker decrease in e m , it is optimal for the public …rm to set e m relatively low and attract additional motivated workers. Thereby, the public …rm increases the total rents from motivation generated in the public sector, resulting in lower costs of public goods production. 12 Comparing the cost per unit of e¤ort for each worker type, it follows that the public …rm prefers to hire motivated workers. It has to pay lazy and regular workers as much for their e¤ort as the private sector does, which implies that total cost would be pQ. Even if the public …rm would let motivated workers work as hard as they do in the private sector, total cost would be lower than pQ, namely pQ n m m V (e m ), as the …rm can fully extract the rents from motivation. Since the …rm optimally sets e m < e m , it follows that total cost are even lower. Clearly, when the public …rm o¤ers the optimal contract to attract motivated workers, lazy and regular workers have no incentive to opt for a public sector job.
Next, consider the case where Q is su¢ ciently large, such that two worker types are needed. Still, the …rm prefers to hire all of the motivated workers as they are the only workers who are willing to work for less than p per unit of e¤ort. The interesting question is which worker type the public …rm prefers to hire in addition to the motivated workers. Total cost Z is given by:
and the production constraint is given by:
where k 2 fr; lg. To attract and separate the two types, the …rm creates two contracts that meet the following conditions. First, the contracts must meet the participation constraint of both types:
Second, the contracts must meet the revelation constraints, that is, each worker must prefer the contract designed for his type to the other contract: 13
Consider …rst the case where the public …rm decides to attract motivated (10) with respect to e m and e r , subject to IR r , IC m , and the production constraint (11) . This gives the following two …rst-order conditions for e m and e r , respectively:
By substituting e r = e r into …rst-order condition (13) and using (4) and (5), the …rst term drops out. Since the second term is positive, it follows that the public …rm induces the regular workers to exert less e¤ort than they do in the private sector, e r < e r . Substituting this result into equation (12), we …nd that the contract for the motivated workers is also distorted. The public …rm induces the motivated workers to exert more e¤ort than they would do in the private sector if they would be motivated to work in the private sector, e m > e x m . Intuitively, as in the standard adverse selection model, the public …rm makes the contract of the regular workers less attractive to motivated workers by decreasing the level of e¤ort in that contract. Thereby, it can extract a greater part of the rents from motivation from the motivated workers.
However, this decrease in e¤ort implies that the public …rm needs to hire more regular workers to meet the production constraint, which is costly. It can decrease these costs by increasing the e¤ort of motivated workers. In the optimum, the cost of an additional unit of e¤ort by giving stronger incentives to the motivated workers is equal to the cost of an additional unit of e¤ort by hiring an additional regular worker. 14 Next, consider the case where the public …rm decides to attract motivated and lazy workers, k = l. If the revelation constraint of motivated workers IC m is binding, the optimisation problem of the public …rm is similar to that above, leading to …rst-order conditions (12) and (13) with r = l.
Hence, the public …rm distorts both contracts by giving lazy workers weaker incentives than private …rms do, and motivated workers stronger incentives than private …rms would.
Interestingly, however, when the public …rm attracts lazy workers, it is also possible that the revelation constraint does not bind, i.e. that the contract for lazy workers is less appealing to motivated workers than working in the private sector. 15 In this case, IR m and IR l are binding, while IC m and IC l are non-binding. Then, the optimisation problem of the public …rm is to minimise cost (10) with respect to e m and e l , subject to IR l , IR m , and the production constraint (11) . This gives the following two …rst-order conditions for e m and e l , respectively:
By substituting e l = e l and using (4) and (5), we …nd that the …rst term between brackets of …rst-order condition (15) is zero. Hence, the public …rm sets the level of e¤ort for the lazy workers equal to their optimal level of e¤ort in the private sector. Obviously, their wage must also be at the same level as in the private sector. Substituting this result into …rst-order condition (14) gives e m = e x m . Hence, neither contract is distorted and the contract o¤ered to motivated workers extracts all of their rents (as IR m is binding). 16 The …nal step is to show which type of workers the public …rm optimally attracts in addition to the motivated workers. Let us start with the case we just discussed, where the participation constraint of motivated workers IR m is binding if the …rm attracts lazy workers. The public …rm pays p per unit of e¤ort to lazy workers and extracts all of the motivational rents from motivated workers. When, instead, the public …rm attracts regular workers, the revelation constraint of the motivated workers is always binding. Therefore, the public …rm can not extract all of the rents from motivation.
Moreover, it distorts the contract of the regular workers, implying that the cost per unit of e¤ort of regular workers is greater than p. Hence, total cost are lower if the public …rm attracts lazy rather than regular workers.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated workers IC m is binding if the public …rm attracts lazy workers. In Appendix A2, we prove that total cost Z decrease in the general work ethic of the non-motivated worker type k , @Z=@ k < 0. Hence, besides motivated workers, the public …rm prefers to attract the economy's laziest workers. The intuition is straightforward. The extraction of motivational rents from motivated workers by the public …rm is hampered by the revelation constraint for motivated workers IC m . To induce motivated workers to choose the proper contract, they must receive all rents they would obtain by choosing the other type's contract. A contract satisfying a lazy worker's participation constraint has lower wage and lower required e¤ort than a contract satisfying a regular worker's participation constraint. Therefore, a lazy worker's contract is less appealing to a motivated worker than a regular worker's contract, implying that the public …rm can extract more rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers rather than regular workers. 17 It follows that the public …rm can produce the same output at lower cost by attracting lazy rather than regular workers. Moreover, the public …rm may deliberately provide weak incentives to lazy workers, implying that lazy workers in the public sector exert less e¤ort than lazy workers who are employed in the private sector. The laziness of civil servants may thus be a sign of cost-e¢ cient government!
Social Welfare
In this section, we impose that the public …rm maximises social welfare, which we de…ne as the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy. Recall that, so far, we ignored taxation as our assumption of lump-sum taxes implies that none of the decisions by the workers or the cost-minimising public …rm are a¤ected by taxation. However, taxes do a¤ect workers'utility and, hence, social welfare. The total amount of taxes is simply the sum of the wages of the public sector workers (Z). Since utility is linear in income, social welfare can be written as: 18
Recall that n i denotes the number of workers of type i 2 fr; m; lg hired by the public …rm. By using (3), the above expression can be rewritten to:
Hence, the public …rm maximises total utility in the private sector minus the net cost of e¤ort in the public sector.
In Appendices A3 and A4, we prove that the optimal choice of the social planner is identical to that of a cost-minimising public …rm when e¤ort is unveri…able, and when e¤ort is veri…able and Q is su¢ ciently small, respectively. Thus, when e¤ort is unveri…able, regular workers are least attractive to the public …rm, and lazy and motivated workers may both be the best choice. When e¤ort is veri…able and Q is su¢ ciently small, the public …rm attracts motivated workers, and induces them to exert a level of e¤ort smaller than private …rms do, e m < e m .
When e¤ort is veri…able and Q is su¢ ciently large, social welfare (17) can be rewritten as:
where subscript k 2 fr; lg denotes the non-motivated worker type the …rm hires. Maximising (18) with respect to e m and e k , subject to production constraint (11), yields the following …rst-order conditions:
Using (4) and (5), it follows that …rst-order condition (20) is zero for e k = e k .
Hence, the non-motivated worker type is induced to exert the same level of e¤ort as in the private sector. This implies that the public …rm is indi¤erent between hiring lazy and regular workers, as both types need to be paid p per unit of e¤ort. Substituting this result into …rst-order condition (19) , it follows that the e¤ort of motivated workers is (implicitly) given by (6), the level of e¤ort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they would derive utility from working there, e m = e x m . Hence, a social planner does not distort the contracts of its employees. Wages are set such that the participation constraints IR k and IR m and the revelation constraints IC k and IC m are all satis…ed. 19 The social welfare maximising contracts di¤er from those o¤ered by the cost-minimising public …rm. This implies that, when the public …rm maximises social welfare, social welfare is higher, but also that total cost and, hence, taxes are higher. Apart from the di¤erence in taxes, lazy and regular workers attain the same level of utility, U i , in both cases. Hence, as taxes are higher, social welfare maximisation makes lazy and regular workers worse o¤. It follows that only motivated workers bene…t from having a social welfare maximising government. When motivated workers constitute a minority in society, politicians are likely to act in the interest of lazy and regular workers and strive for minimum cost of public goods production.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that, in addition to workers with a public service motivation, the public sector may prefer to hire the economy's laziest workers and provide them with weaker incentives than the market sector does. Even though this reduces aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better o¤, as motivated workers can be hired at lower wage, and hence public goods are produced at lower cost. When e¤ort is to a large extent unveri…able in the public sector, the public sector may hire too many lazy workers as they crowd out motivated workers.
We have restricted Q such that two worker types are su¢ cient. It is a straightforward repetition of the analyses to allow for values of Q such that the public …rm needs all three worker types. When the di¤erence in general work ethic between lazy and regular workers is su¢ ciently large, the contract for lazy workers is not distorted, whereas the public …rm distorts the contracts for motivated and regular workers. Otherwise, the contract for lazy workers will be distorted as well. In the limit, when Q ! 1, the public …rm does not distort any contract, as can be seen from …rst-order condition (13) . When the …rm needs a great number of non-motivated workers, the costs of distorting the contract for non-motivated workers are large compared to the bene…ts of rent extraction from the motivated workers.
We have abstracted from interactions between the workers. Work morale, however, may be a¤ected by the behaviour of one's colleagues. The enthu- La¤ont and Tirole (1993) . Then, the social planner trades o¤ the ine¢ ciencies arising from taxation against the ine¢ ciency of distorting the contracts of the workers in the public sector. siasm of coworkers may be stimulating, whereas shirking colleagues may reduce the incentive to work (Stowe, 2002) . Likewise, motivated workers may consider the wage paid to lazy workers to be unfair given the di¤erence in e¤ort. Then, attracting lazy workers may be detrimental to the e¤ort of motivated workers. Further, if the pace of production depends on the 'weakest link', it may not be optimal to hire lazy workers.
A Appendices

A.1 Conditions under which hiring two types of workers is optimal
Unveri…able e¤ort Because the public …rm can not induce workers to exert a certain level of e¤ort, it is necessary to attract a second worker type as soon as Q > N i e i , where i is the worker type the …rm prefers to employ when Q is su¢ ciently low. As argued in the main text, it might happen that the public …rm can not single out its most preferred type. Then, the public …rm always employs two worker types.
Veri…able e¤ort, cost-minimisation First, consider the case where the participation constraint of motivated workers IR m binds when the public …rm attracts lazy workers, while the revelation constraint IC m is non-binding. Marginal cost of e¤ort when hiring a lazy worker is p. This implies that the public …rm hires lazy workers as soon as the marginal cost of e¤ort of motivated workers exceeds p. Di¤erentiating the participation constraint (7) of motivated workers with respect to e m gives:
Hence, the public …rm attracts a second worker type when Q > N m e m , where e m is de…ned by:
Note that (A2) is identical to (6) . Hence, e m = e x m , which is the optimal level of e¤ort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they would derive utility from working in the private sector.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated workers IC m binds when the public …rm attracts lazy workers, while the participation constraint IR m is non-binding. It is obvious that the public …rm attracts only motivated workers when Q N m e m . Now consider higher levels of Q. When the …rm does not attract lazy workers, total cost can be found by substituting the production constraint Q = N m e m and the participation constraint (7) of motivated workers into total cost Z 1 = N m w m :
It is easy to verify that Z 1 is a continuous and convex function of Q. When, instead, the public …rm attracts both motivated and lazy workers, total cost discontinuously increase, as the public …rm can no longer extract all motivational rents from the motivated workers. Suppose the public …rm would not distort the contracts of its workers, e l = e l and e m = e m (= e x m ). Then, total cost when the public …rm attracts both lazy and motivated workers, Z 2 , is a linear function of Q , as the marginal cost of e¤ort equals p. Hence, Z 1 and Z 2 intersect at some level of Q > N m e m . Since the public …rm optimally distorts the contracts of its workers when it attracts both lazy and motivated workers so as to decrease cost, the minimum level of Q at which it is optimal to attract lazy workers is smaller than the level at which Z 1 and Z 2 intersect. Veri…able e¤ort, social planner As the social planner induces lazy and regular workers to exert the same level of e¤ort as in the private sector, this case is similar to the case where the participation constraint of motivated workers IR m binds when the costminimising public …rm attracts lazy workers.
A.2 Proof that
By substituting the production constraint (11), IR k , IC m , and (5) into total cost (10), we …nd: where, by the envelop theorem, all e¤ects through e k , e k , and e m are zero, and the sign follows from e k < e k (see …rst-order condition (13)).
A.3 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation yield identical results when e¤ort is unveri…able A cost-minimising public …rm attracts the worker type that minimises Z = n i w i . After substituting the production constraint n i = Q=e i and (7), we …nd that:
A welfare-maximising public …rm attracts the worker type that maximises (17) . After substituting the production constraint n i = Q=e i , we …nd that:
Obviously, these two optimisation problems yield the same results.
A. 4 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation yield identical results when e¤ort is veri…able and Q is su¢ ciently small A welfare-maximising public …rm maximises (17) with respect to e i , subject to the production constraint n i = Q=e i . This gives …rst-order condition:
which is, except for opposite signs, identical to …rst-order condition (9) derived in Section 5. Hence, the optimal contract of a welfare-maximising public …rm is identical to that of a cost-minimising public …rm.
